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With dwindling nonrenewable energy reserves and the adverse effects of climate change, the development
of the smart electricity grid is seen as key to solving global energy security issues and to reducing carbon
emissions. In this respect, there is a growing need to integrate renewable (or green) energy sources in the
grid. However, the intermittency of these energy sources requires that demand must also be made more
responsive to changes in supply, and a number of smart grid technologies are being developed, such as high-
capacity batteries and smart meters for the home, to enable consumers to be more responsive to conditions
on the grid in real time. Traditional solutions based on these technologies, however, tend to ignore the fact
that individual consumers will behave in such a way that best satisﬁes their own preferences to use or
store energy (as opposed to that of the supplier or the grid operator). Hence, in practice, it is unclear how
these solutions will cope with large numbers of consumers using their devices in this way. Against this
background, in this article, we develop novel control mechanisms based on the use of autonomous agents to
better incorporate consumer preferences in managing demand. These agents, residing on consumers’ smart
meters, can both communicate with the grid and optimize their owner’s energy consumption to satisfy their
preferences. More speciﬁcally, we provide a novel control mechanism that models and controls a system
comprising of a green energy supplier operating within the grid and a number of individual homes (each
possibly owning a storage device). This control mechanism is based on the concept of homeostasis whereby
control signals are sent to individual components of a system, based on their continuous feedback, in order
to change their state so that the system may reach a stable equilibrium. Thus, we deﬁne a new carbon-based
pricing mechanism for this green energy supplier that takes advantage of carbon-intensity signals available
on the Internet in order to provide real-time pricing. The pricing scheme is designed in such a way that
it can be readily implemented using existing communication technologies and is easily understandable by
consumers. Building upon this, we develop new control signals that the supplier can use to incentivize agents
to shift demand (using their storage device) to times when green energy is available. Moreover, we show
how these signals can be adapted according to changes in supply and to various degrees of penetration of
storage in the system. We empirically evaluate our system and show that, when all homes are equipped with
storage devices, the supplier can signiﬁcantly reduce its reliance on other carbon-emitting power sources to
cater for its own shortfalls. By so doing, the supplier reduces the carbon emission of the system by up to 25%
while the consumer reduces its costs by up to 14.5%. Finally, we demonstrate that our homeostatic control
mechanism is not sensitive to small prediction errors and the supplier is incentivized to accurately predict
its green production to minimize costs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Achieving energy security and reducing carbon emissions have been recognized as two
of the most important challenges of this century given the rapid depletion of worldwide
oil and gas reserves and the potentially devastating effects of climate change [DECC
2009a; US Department Of Energy 2003]. To this end, the creation of a smart electricity
grid has been advocated as a key component in delivering efﬁcient low-carbon energy.
In particular, the vision of a smart grid includes technologies that reduce losses in the
transmission of electricity, that integrate intermittent renewable energy generators
(such as wind turbines and solar panels), and that attempt to reduce or shift demand
by providing real-time information about consumption and prices using smart meters
in homes.
In this article we focus in particular on the pressing problem of integrating renew-
able energy generation into the smart grid. This is an important challenge because
the integration of renewable energy generators requires a signiﬁcant shift from the
traditional principle of “supply follows demand” whereby generators always have to
keep up with demand in the grid. To date, this has been acceptable only because the
output from nonrenewable energy sources (such as coal or gas ﬁred power stations)
can be turned up or down at will. In contrast, renewable energy generators (i.e., green
suppliers) are sensitive to seasons and weather conditions and are therefore variable
and intermittent in their output. This means that they cannot be powered up at will
to meet the demand, nor is it possible to accurately predict exactly how much energy
they will generate. While, from a technical point of view, integrating renewable energy
requires the development of technologies to ensure power ﬂows in a controlled manner
from renewable energy generators to the grid, from an economic point of view, renew-
able energy suppliers need to devise new strategies to trade effectively in the electricity
markets in which they operate in order to ensure that they can make a proﬁt while still
satisfying the demand from their consumers given the intermittency in their supply.
When the supplier is not able to satisfy the demand of its customers from its own re-
newable generation capacity, it must typically buy additional electricity at short notice
(usually incurring a high cost which reduces its potential proﬁts) from the wholesale
electricity market within which it operates [Kirschen and Strbac 2004]. Conversely,
when the supplier produces more than its customers demand, it must sell this extra
electricity at a lower price than what it would typically obtain from its customers.1 It
is therefore crucial for the supplier to predict its production accurately in order to bid
effectively in markets, but more importantly, the supplier should be able to inﬂuence
the demand from its customers to mitigate the impact of low production.
Now, while the issue of predicting renewable energy production and bidding in elec-
tricity markets has been actively researched in the power systems domain [Kirschen
and Strbac 2004; Milligan et al. 2009; Morales et al. 2010], there is relatively little
work studying how to inﬂuence the demand of residential consumers (see Section 2
for more details). Typical approaches to demand management involve the supplier
sending a predicted real-time price, via the consumers’ smart meter, to incentivize
1In general, a supplier acts as the middle-man between the generators from which it buys electricity and the
customers to which it sells electricity. However, we consider the case of the generator and the supplier being
the same actor as is often the case in the U.K. or U.S. electricity market, particularly with regards to “green”
focused suppliers such as Ecotricity (U.K.), New England GreenStart, or Green Mountain Energy (U.S.).
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them to increase or decrease demand [Faruqui and George 2005]. These mechanisms
assume that by feeding more information to consumers, the latter will be able to
understand the conditions on the grid (e.g., generator outages or a high price for
electricity at peak time) and react to such conditions by switching devices on or off,
or changing their thermostat settings on their heaters (or air conditioners), and in
future, use electricity stored in their home or electric car battery. However, such an
assumption is challenged by the fact that the signals from the grid, aside from being
rather complex for the average user [Schweppe et al. 1989], require the user to perform
complex calculations in order to optimize her consumption and storage of electricity
(i.e., to know what is the best time to store or use electricity). Given this, in this
article, we advocate the use of autonomous software agents as a decentralized control
paradigm whereby each owner would have her own agent, running on her smart
meter, advising on the best consumption pattern she could adopt to achieve her goals
(e.g., minimizing carbon emissions and/or costs). A key advantage of this approach
is that consumers do not need to be experts at energy trading or scheduling in order
to maximize their beneﬁts, therefore their adoption allows for a larger impact in
implementing demand management strategies based on complex signals from the grid.
In more detail, agents can be endowed with the ability to learn their owner’s prefer-
ences from their consumption history and can run optimization algorithms that solve
complex scheduling tasks (e.g., heating cycles of boilers or charging proﬁles of their
electric car battery) with very little direct input, if at all, from their owner. In so doing,
these agents can minimize their owner’s cost, given price signals from the grid, by efﬁ-
ciently scheduling the on/off cycles of deferrable devices (such as washing machines or
boilers) or the storage proﬁles of batteries (i.e., storing when prices are low and using
the stored electricity when prices are high). However, even if a real-time price signal is
provided by the grid or supplier, agents have no indication as to how much they should
change their usage (by deferring loads) or store electricity in order to meet the capacity
of the renewable energy supplier. This is important because, if, for example, the agents
are incentivized to consume more, based on a low predicted price, the aggregate might
end up consuming much more than can be provided by the supplier. Conversely, given
a high price, the collection of agents might consume much less than what the supplier
produces leaving the supplier with unused green energy. Hence, in general, relying
solely on the price signal may result in a mismatch between the production capacity
of the supplier and the demand from the consumers that might require the supplier to
buy extra capacity at a high price or sell its extra production at a loss on the wholesale
electricity market. The supplier may, in turn, pass on such costs to its customers and
also increase the consumers’ carbon emissions as it uses carbon-emitting generators
(from which it buys on the wholesale market) to supply their extra demands. Moreover,
providing only a price signal ignores the fact that some agents may also be aiming to
reduce their owner’s carbon emissions (as there is a growing population of such green
users [Kockar et al. 2009]) since such a signal ignores the carbon intensity (i.e., the car-
bon emissions per unit of energy) of the energy being supplied. Given these issues with
real-time pricing in this domain, it is crucial that better control mechanisms are devel-
oped to mitigate the occurrence of such mismatches in order to make the integration of
renewable energy into the smart grid more proﬁtable and more reliable. In particular,
given the reaction of the agents to such signals, the controller (i.e., supplier) should be
able to provide feedback to the agents in order for them to adjust their consumption
proﬁle while still allowing them to minimize their costs and their carbon emissions.
The challenge here is to generate such signals and stabilize the system without the
supplier being able to fully observe the state of the individual agents in terms of their
proﬁle of electricity usage. This challenge is further exacerbated by the fact that the
agents may not wish to reveal their battery storage capacity (which determines by how
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much they can defer demand to follow supply) as they may not trust the provider to
use this information to their beneﬁt.
To meet this challenge, in this article, we introduce the concept of agent-based home-
ostatic control to coordinate a green supplier and its consumers, who may own storage
capability, within the smart grid.2 In particular, we model a system composed of a green
energy supplier (e.g., a wind and/or solar powered generator) providing electricity to a
large number of consumers whose aims are to reduce their individual costs and carbon
emissions. To capture the consumers’ preferences and goals, we develop agents that
can optimize their owner’s battery storage proﬁle according to signals from the grid.
Our model aims to capture real-life settings where, for example, a third-party wind
turbine/photovoltaic array provides energy to a small number of houses or buildings,
or where a regional/national supplier serves customers across a wide area. We then
provide a novel control mechanism to ensure that demand from the agents follows
the production from the green supplier. Our approach is inspired from the principle of
homeostasis [Marieb and Hoehn 2007]. The latter describes a living organism’s adjust-
ment of its internal interdependent components to maintain a stable constant condition
and was ﬁrst used in the context of the electricity grid by Schweppe et al. [1980]. The
analogy between our system and a living organism is appropriate given that our sys-
tem is based on the three underpinning concepts of homeostasis: sensing, sending a
control signal, and feedback. First, our system is able to sense and predict3 the effect of
external conditions (i.e., weather in our case) using widely available weather sensors
and satellite imagery. Second, the supplier can compute a control signal to be sent to
the agents based on the impact of weather conditions on its production of electricity.
Third, through the resulting response of the agents in the system (i.e., the combined
effect of its load and storage proﬁles), feedback is provided to the supplier which de-
cides how to adapt its control signal to ensure the system reaches the state it desires.
Through several iterations of the preceding process, the system aims to converge to
a more efﬁcient solution (see Section 6). While the idea of homeostatic control in this
domain was pioneered more than 30 years ago, it was not deemed practical at the time
due to the lack of communication and distributed computing technologies that would
allow large populations of consumers of different types (of different income and usage
levels) to participate in such mechanisms. However, with the prevalence of broadband
communications4 and the development of agent-based technologies for a wide variety
of applications including the energy domain [Jennings et al. 1996; Bussmann et al.
2004], it is now possible to revisit this proposition and instantiate homeostatic control
mechanisms within the smart grid.
In more detail, this article advances the state-of-the-art in the following ways:
(1) We implement a novel real-time carbon-based pricing mechanism that builds on the
carbon intensity signals provided by the grid (e.g., the National Grid in the U.K. or
Eire Grid in Ireland already provide this data in real time) through the Internet.5
Using this mechanism, suppliers, using renewable energy sources or not, do not
2Our approach can be generalized to consider loads such as washing machines or boilers that can be deferred
to achieve results similar to using storage, but this is beyond the scope of this article.
3Note that we do not develop novel sensing and prediction algorithms as this is beyond the scope of this
work. Rather, we assume such predictions are available and focus on building the control mechanism that
uses such predictions. However, as we show in Section 6, our mechanism is robust to errors in prediction
and hence, as better prediction technology is developed, the beneﬁts accrued from using our mechanism will
only improve. Future work will study such prediction algorithms in more detail.
4Google PowerMeter (http://www.google.com/powermeter) and AlertMe (http://www.alertme.com) systems
already utilize home broadband links in order to monitor energy consumption over the Web.
5See http://www.bmreports.com and http://www.ideasproject.info/software.
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need to install additional hardware to compute and transmit a real-time price to
consumers as it can easily be obtained over an existing broadband connection. We
show that by setting a price plan to match the carbon intensity of the grid, suppliers
can effectively align the carbon-based prices to the real-time prices they effectively
trade at on the grid. Such a pricing scheme also means that, should demand be
higher than can be met by the green supplier, the greenest form of energy from
the grid (where a mix of green and nongreen suppliers also exist) will be bought
by the supplier to meet excess demand. By so doing, carbon-sensitive consumers
are incentivized to subscribe to the supplier since they can minimize both their
costs and carbon emissions at the same time. In turn, this helps the supplier
reduce its reliance on other grid energy sources with high carbon emissions (for
which the supplier may be taxed according to the market regime it operates within
[Kockar et al. 2009; Hobbs et al. 2010]). It is also important to note that our pricing
scheme is not restricted to just a green supplier as our prices (except the price
of energy strictly obtainable from the green supplier) are only dependent on the
conditions on the grid (i.e., grid carbon intensity reﬂecting generation costs). Thus,
our pricing scheme could potentially be used by any supplier trying to appeal to
an environmentally conscious consumer aiming to reduce her contribution to the
overall carbon emissions of the grid.
(2) We develop a novel control signal which ensures that agents are incentivized to
store a given quantity of electricity according to changes in green energy generation
capacity caused by changing weather conditions. The signal provides an estimate
to the agent of how much it should aim to change its storage behavior in order to
minimize its costs.
(3) Wedevelopalgorithms,basedonmathematicalprogramming,foragentstooptimize
theirenergystorage,giventhecontrolsignaltheyreceive,inordertominimizetheir
costs, and in so doing, their carbon emissions.
(4) We provide a novel adaptive mechanism for the green supplier to learn the best
signal to send to the agents in order to maximize its efﬁciency. In particular, the
mechanism works even when the supplier is unaware of the proportion of the
consumers in the system that possess enough storage to cope with the variability
in supply (which cannot be accurately predicted by the supplier).
(5) We empirically evaluate our approach and show that our agent-based homeostatic
control with our novel adaptive mechanism (compared to a traditional real-time
pricing mechanism) results in up to 25% improvement in efﬁciency (which max-
imizes the use of green energy by its pool of consumers and hence reduces their
carbon emissions) for the supplier and up to 14.5% savings for the agents. Fur-
thermore, we show how errors in the supplier predicting its green production can
result in higher costs or carbon emissions. In particular, we show that the supplier
is incentivized to accurately predict its green production to minimize its costs and
that our homeostatic control mechanism is not sensitive to small prediction errors.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the general back-
ground of our work and outlines the rationale behind our design choices. Section 3
describes the model of the green supplier and the agents, each endowed with their own
preferences and their battery storage capabilities. Given this, in Section 4, we present
our novel carbon-based pricing mechanism. Then, Section 5 details our homeostatic
control mechanism. Section 6 evaluates our mechanism and Section 7 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The issue of integrating renewable energy supplies into the grid to reduce carbon
emissions while ensuring their intermittency does not have an adverse impact (e.g., by
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requiring more spinning reserves or causing brownouts) has been actively researched
for a number of years. The seminal idea of using homeostatic control to account for
intermittency (for any energy source type) was initially suggested by Schweppe et al.
[1980], who foresaw that improvements in communication technologies would pave the
way for new control mechanisms to coordinate energy suppliers with users in order to
account for shortfalls (e.g., by asking them to reduce consumption) or excesses (e.g.,
by letting them consume more) in energy supplies in real time [Schweppe et al. 1980].
Such mechanisms would then allow demand to follow supply. Their work, however,
remained preliminary and, as such, untested under simulated settings. In particular,
they did not model the individual behavior of agents (in terms of their basic preferences
and how they optimized their consumption) and did not consider the issue of carbon
emissions to be important at the time. Moreover, they used the frequency of Alternating
Current (AC) as a vehicle for real-time pricing. In the absence of other communication
mechanisms, this choice was probably the only viable one. However, while frequency is
a good indicator of generation failing to meet demand, it does not correspond to the cost
of electricity in real-time electricity markets [Schweppe et al. 1989]. In contrast, our
more up-to-date approach is able to exploit recent communication and computational
advances in order to model individual agent behaviors and develop pricing mechanisms
and control signals that can be communicated in real time while still matching the
current market conditions.
Since Schweppe’s work, most research in the power systems community has focused
on facilitating the integration of intermittent sources of energy by providing more re-
liable predictions and control of energy generation from such sources [Milligan et al.
2009; Morales et al. 2010] or by matching renewable energy generators with high-
capacity electricity storage providers (either attached to wind turbines or performing
arbitrage in an electricity market) [Burgio et al. 2009; Lubosny and Bialek 2007;
Bathurst and Strbac 2003; Makarov et al. 2010; Korpaas et al. 2003]. Hence, most
of this work has focused on the use of large “utility-scale” batteries controlled by one
user as opposed to small domestic batteries (e.g., electric cars or water heaters6) where
each battery is individually owned and where the owner is only intent on maximizing
her own preferences. This is mainly due to the fact that coordinating a large number
of individual users (owning batteries) with suppliers relies on robust communications
that were previously considered too expensive [Kirschen and Strbac 2004] and that
such storage facilities may be too expensive to implement on a large scale (i.e., across
26M households in the U.K.). However, with the advent of high-speed (mobile) broad-
band and less expensive battery storage technology (e.g., with electric cars such as
the Mini E and the Nissan Leaf, and deep-cycle battery technologies from Ceramatec,
for example), this argument is no longer valid. Hence, several approaches and ﬁeld
trials (e.g., the GridWise Project, the Energy Demand Research Project [Smith 2010]
or PowerMatcher7) have emerged which consider the use of demand-side management
techniques (DSM) (based on real-time pricing using AC frequency or time of use pric-
ing) to control demand [Inﬁeld et al. 2007; Hammerstrom et al. 2008]. However, such
approaches do not address the use of storage devices to defer the consumption of elec-
tricity and again ignore the individual preferences of the users.8
6Note that the storage of hot water or air is effectively equivalent to the storage of electrical energy in some
settings.
7See more details at http://gridwise.pnl.gov and http://www.powermatcher.net.
8The GridWise project trials allowed users to set their preferences for the price at which devices should turn
off. However, these preferences were assumed ﬁxed throughout the day. However, it was recognized that
users’ preferences to use certain devices (e.g., to use heating or hot water) vary across the day and, as a
result, they were given the capability to override their settings at any time.
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A number of agent-based approaches that do consider the incentives of individual
actors on the grid have been developed over the last decade. For example, Ygge initi-
ated work on abstracting electricity markets as multicommodity markets and showed
how agents trading energy for different times of the day could generate efﬁcient al-
locations [Ygge et al. 1999]. Moreover, Jennings et al. [1996] developed coordination
mechanisms fordifferent actors onthegridtomanage theallocation of transmissionca-
pacity [Jennings et al. 1996] and, more recently, Sun and Testfatsion [2007] and Li and
Testfatsion [2009] have developed agent-based electricity market simulations which
factored in transmission constraints and different types of buyers and sellers in the
grid. Kok and Venekamp [2010] take a similar approach and implement an agent-based
architecture to run the electricity market where the individual actors represent either
generators or devices in the home whereas Gerding et al. [2011] and Chalkiadakis
et al. [2010] adopt a game-theoretic approach to managing electric vehicle charging
and organizing collectives of wind energy generators respectively. Moreover, Li et al.
[2010] recently proposed a mechanism that coordinates a population of agents in op-
timizing their loads to avoid going over a given limit on demand. Their agents are
designed to satisfy both the individual’s and the system’s goals (in capping demand).
However, their approach requires agents to communicate their individual plans (to
optimize their resources) to the system, leading it to be scalable to no more than ten
thousand agents. In general, none of these works deals speciﬁcally with the variability
of supply when renewable energy sources are involved. Moreover, these approaches
do not consider the daily consumption proﬁle of consumers and how an agent might
optimize its consumption to solely maximize its owner’s beneﬁt (in cost savings). We
believe this is crucial because agents have to be proﬁtable to their users, each with her
own speciﬁc needs and lifestyle, in order to be commercially viable. Moreover, in our
recent work, we showed how such agents can be modelled to individually optimize the
storage of electricity given a real-time price and how this led to demand on the grid
being ﬂattened (without explicitly exchanging plans among agents) [Vytelingum et al.
2010; Ramchurn et al. 2011]. While we did consider the preferences of the agents, we
did not address the issue of external inﬂuences (i.e., weather conditions in our case) on
the supply of electricity. Hence, this article bridges a major gap in this area by modeling
the agents in the system, each with its own preferences, and by providing the control
mechanism to ensure demand follows supply.
Our work is also inspired from the recent upsurge in eco-friendly energy providers
such as Ecotricity,9 Green Mountain Energy,10 or New England GreenStart11 that
supply their consumers from their own green energy sources. Their success stems
from the fact that there is a large portion of consumers intent on minimizing their
individual carbon emissions. However, such companies cannot satisfy all their demand
from their own renewable generators (e.g., Ecotricity only generated around 41% of the
energy they sold in 2009–2010) and they have to buy the rest from other conventional
sources. Given this, the carbon-based pricing scheme we propose in this article departs
from the ﬁxed pricing scheme provided by these companies, to incentivize users to
minimize their carbon emissions in real time while also minimizing their costs. Thus,
our work sets the stage for new tariffs that can readily be applied once smart meters are
rolled out.12
9http://www.ecotricity.co.uk.
10http://www.greenmountainenergy.com.
11http://www.massenergy.org/renewable-energy/negs.
12The U.K. government has planned to equip all 26M houses in the country with a smart meter by 2020
while in the U.S. it is expected that about 60M houses will be equipped by the same date. Similar targets are
in place in Europe with Italy having already completed its smart meter deployment.
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Furthermore, in future energy markets where carbon emissions may be taxed
[Kockar et al. 2009; Gajbhiye and Soman 2010], our work on the carbon-based pricing
scheme also reduces the suppliers’ operational risks. The intuition is that if suppliers
can pass on some of their costs, due to carbon taxes, to their consumers, the latter will
be incentivized to align their behavior to the needs of the supplier. Thus, if consumers
are charged for their carbon emissions, they will optimize their behavior to reduce
their emissions, and hence reduce the tax paid. Proposed approaches to mitigating
suppliers’ carbon costs have focused on balancing the objective of minimizing costs and
minimizing carbon emissions as a complex optimization problem [Hobbs et al. 2010;
Wong et al. 2010; Kockar et al. 2009; Mazer 2007; Harris 2005]. Alternative approaches
considering the use of carbon intensity signals, as we do here, are practically nonexis-
tent since, we believe, such technological solutions involving the use of information and
communication technologies, rather than metering devices on the grid, are less pop-
ular among power systems engineers. Hence, this article embodies the fundamentals
of computational sustainability [Gomes 2009] by providing computational solutions to
real-time electricity pricing that can be rapidly and reliably deployed in the smart grid
to generate greater efﬁciencies.
3. GREEN SUPPLIER AND AGENT MODELS
Inthiswork,weassumethatitwillnotbepossible,atleastinthenearfuture,tobefully
reliant on green energy sources [DECC 2009b]. Rather, we focus on a more realistic
scenario which is more representative of the case today where a green supplier is
operating in a market where there are mostly brown (i.e., carbon emitting) sources of
electricity (e.g., in markets run by National Grid13 or PJM14 on the U.S. east coast).
Speciﬁcally,Figure1depictsthemainelementsofthesysteminvolvingthesupplierand
the consumers. Thus, the grid (consisting of electricity markets and physical networks)
and weather (e.g., wind speed or sunshine) act as external inﬂuences on them. Hence,
in the following sections, we detail each element of our system and the information
ﬂows between them by providing a generic model of a green energy supplier (typically
with wind or solar power generation capability) and consumers (represented each by its
agent) which may possess electricity storage capacity (e.g., either batteries or electric
vehicles) and which are keen to minimize their carbon emissions (hence their contract
with the green supplier). In our models, we assume that a day is divided into a set of
half-hourly slots T ={ 1,2,...,48} such that each actor needs to decide its behavior
(typically four hours before or a day ahead) for each slot. Smaller slots (e.g., 5 or
15 minutes) could be considered but half-hour slots are used here as this is a common
interval used within electricity meters and electricity markets.
3.1. The Green Supplier
We model the green supplier (e.g., with wind turbines and/or solar power generators)
as having a pool of consumers that subscribe to it for electricity.15 The supplier can
predict, with a reasonable level of accuracy (usually four hours ahead using sensors
and historical data [Milligan et al. 2009]), that it will generate a given amount of
electricity qi ∈ R+,∀i ∈ T. Now, in line with today’s reality we model our supplier
as being able to satisfy only part of its consumers’ demand, acquiring the remainder
13http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk.
14http://www.pjm.com.
15Our model considers only one green supplier operating in the grid where other possibly nongreen suppliers
also operate. If we were to consider a grid populated by mostly green suppliers, then each green supplier
would have to consider the possibility of not being able to supply its electricity from the grid at times when
none of the others is able to generate sufﬁcient electricity. This would mean adding a hard constraint on the
consumers’ demand and/or price very expensively any consumption above the level provided by the grid.
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, Vol. 2, No. 4, Article 35, Publication date: July 2011.Agent-Based Homeostatic Control for Green Energy in the Smart Grid 35:9
Grid
Consumer demand
Generation
Distribution
Markets
Transmission
Electricity ﬂow Information ﬂow
Supplier Consumers
Price Plan
Electricity Intensity
Carbon
Generation Capacity
Renewable energy
Homes with different or no batteries
Prices
via smart meter
Fig. 1. Here we illustrate the electricity and information ﬂows between the actors in the system we consider.
Speciﬁcally, our model speciﬁes the price plan used by the supplier, the heterogeneous storage devices used
by the consumers, as well as the decision making involved in charging or using their battery. We also assume
that the grid provides the carbon intensity signals which we use in our mechanism but do not consider how
the electricity is transmitted and delivered to consumers by the grid.
from the wholesale electricity market. While the availability of supply from the grid
is guaranteed, its price is generally driven by the market demand and supply (see the
relationship between price and demand in Figure 2(a)). In particular, depending on its
energy production pattern, the supplier has a number of potential ways of pricing its
electricity in real time based on what it expects the wholesale spot market prices to
be and any existing future and forward contracts that it holds. Thus, while spot prices
determine the supplier’s real-time trading strategy, forward and futures contracts aim
to hedge the risk of very high peak prices in the spot market. Typically, buying extra
capacity on the spot market is more costly than in a forward contract and selling extra
capacityisusuallydonewithaveryloworpossiblynegativeproﬁt[Harris2005].Hence,
the green supplier needs to ensure that it minimizes the amount of extra capacity it
needs to buy in spot markets by getting its consumers to follow its production pattern.
Moreover, a key challenge here is to align the goals of maximizing proﬁt while meeting
the goals of its customers to minimize their carbon emissions. Hence, we address these
issues through a combination of pricing and control as we show in Sections 4 and 5.
3.2. The Consumer Agents
Here, we describe our model of the consumer agent, which builds upon and extends a
recent model for homes equipped with smart meters [Vytelingum et al. 2010]. Thus,
we consider a set of consumers individually represented by their agent, where the set
of agents is A and where each agent a ∈ A has a load proﬁle  a
i ∀i ∈ T, (i.e., its owner’s
predicted consumption of electricity) such that  a
i is the amount of electricity required
by agent afor time interval i during each day. This electricity can either be bought from
the supplier or retrieved from a storage device. Thus, each agent a ∈ A may possess
an electricity storage device with capacity ea ∈ R+, efﬁciency αa ∈ [0,1], and running
costs ca ∈ R+. Here, the cost ca represents maintenance costs or the loss in value of the
device through use over time. We assume this cost is directly proportional to the size
of the device, such that if the size of the battery is ea then the storage cost is caea. The
storage efﬁciency αa models the fact that if qi kWh amount of energy is stored, then
only αaqi kWh may be subsequently used.
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Fig. 2. Relationships between carbon intensity and the price of electricity against demand on the balancing
market (Source: NETA, U.K. August–September 2009).
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The objective of each agent ais to minimize its owner’s cost and hence, it will optimize
its storage proﬁle, ba
i ∀i ∈ I where −ba
− ≤ ba
i ≤ ba
+, where ba
− is the discharging capacity
of the storage (as limited by the efﬁciency and capacity of the battery), and ba
+,t h e
charging capacity. Since the discharging efﬁciency of the storage is regimented by αa,
we separate out the charging and discharging proﬁle such that for all i ∈ T we have
ba
i = b
a+
i −b
a−
i , where b
a+
i is the charging proﬁle and b
a−
i , the discharging proﬁle. Then,
we denote as la
i =  a
i +ba
i the total consumption of an agent at time i and the aggregate
consumption of all agents as lA
i =

a∈Ala
i .
In the next section we describe how consumers are charged in real time for their
electricity and elaborate on the technology to achieve this.
4. THE CARBON-BASED PRICING MECHANISM
To communicate electricity prices, we develop a novel carbon-based pricing scheme
that the supplier sends to its customers. The scheme relies on the availability of a real-
time carbon intensity signal (measured in gCO2/kWh and representing the amount of
CO2 emitted for every unit of energy consumed) that is broadcast on the Internet16 by
national grid operators (as in the U.K. and Ireland).17 The key feature of our pricing
scheme is that the users are guaranteed to pay for the greenest form of energy at all
times if they optimize their consumption pattern (to minimize either costs or carbon
emissions). While such a scheme allows the supplier to pass on some of the costs for
operating in carbon-taxed electricity markets [Hobbs et al. 2010; Kockar et al. 2009], it
also follows from the simple fact that consumers usually subscribe to green suppliers
in order to reduce their carbon emissions and it would be simply inconsistent if any
extra energy that the supplier cannot provide would be supplied by the worst carbon
emitters for the same price. The pricing scheme we develop exploits the correlation
between price and grid demand (shown in Figure 2(a)) and between carbon intensity
and grid demand (shown in Figure 2(b)) (based on real U.K. data). Using this data, we
can infer the correlation between price and carbon intensity as shown in Figure 2(c).
Now, as with other examples of pricing mechanisms (e.g., ﬁxed pricing, time-of-use, or
real-time pricing), the retail prices must be calculated to reﬂect the supplier’s retail
margin proﬁt and its exposure to the risk of peak prices in the wholesale market.18
However, their complexity must be balanced against the need to provide a simple pric-
ing scheme that would appeal to, and be understood by, the average consumer. Thus,
we provide retail rates for different bands of carbon emission (in our case, Band 1 to
16For example, the GridCarbon iPhone/Android app uses information provided by National Grid in the U.K.
to provide real-time updates on the generation mix (i.e., the percentage of energy generated by different
types of plant). Using the latter and a function mapping generation source to carbon intensity, the real-time
aggregate carbon intensity is provided. For more details see http://www.ideasproject.info/software.
17The U.K. carbon intensity can be computed from the generation mix data provided by Elexon
(http://www.bmreports.com/) and is provided on a mobile platform through the GridCarbon app. Ireland’s
real-time carbon intensity can be found at http://www.eirgrid.com. The typical carbon intensity of the U.K.
grid tends to be around 500gC02/kWh (and range between 550 and 450 across a typical day) and that of
Ireland around 225kgCO2/kWh (and range between 280 and 200).
18While we describe the pricing scheme here, the methodology to calculate the retail prices is beyond the
scope of this article (and not critical in our work) as it is very dependent on the different formats of futures
and forward contracts that different suppliers would settle for. For the purpose of this work, we set the band
prices based on a retail margin and considering spot prices of the wholesale market. The supplier would be
required to calculate the retail prices for different carbon emissions on a month-ahead or even year-ahead
basis, such that these rates would be ﬁxed for long periods at a time and periodically reviewed to match
changing grid prices and aggregate consumers’ demand.
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Band 5)19 rather than providing the consumer with a complex equation-mapping be-
tween carbon and price. More formally, these bands are computed as follows.
(1) We split the users’ aggregate consumption in terms of the amount satisﬁed by
the green supplier and the amount drawn from other grid sources such that lA
i =
l
A,green
i + l
A,grid
i at time i ∈ T. Thus, l
A,green
i ∈ R+ is the load from the consumers
that is completely satisﬁed by the green supplier from its own renewable source
such that l
A,green
i ≤ qi (remember qi is the production capacity of the supplier) while
l
A,grid
i ∈ R+ is supplied from other (possibly carbon-emitting) sources on the grid.
(2) l
A,grid
i is priced by our carbon-based pricing scheme (based on ﬁve different bands)
as p
grid
n where n ∈{ 1,2,3,4,5} and p
grid
n < p
grid
m if n < m. We choose n based on
the carbon intensity signal ρi ∈ R+ (kgCO2/kWh) at time i,t h a ti s ,p
grid
n is chosen
if ρmin
n ≤ ρi ≤ ρmax
n where ρmin
n and ρmax
n are the upper and lower bounds of the
band, respectively. For example, according to Figure 2(c), p
grid
1 = 29£/MWh for
0 <ρ i ≤ 275 and p
grid
2 = 41£/MWh for 275 <ρ i ≤ 325.
(3) l
A,green
i (as a Band 0), that is, the amount consumed that is completely satisﬁed by
the green supplier from its own sources, is priced at   less than the greenest band,
Band 1 of the grid as pgreen = p
grid
1 −  .
Through the preceding pricing scheme the supplier incentivizes consumers to use
the green energy (since it always less expensive) it produces rather than grid energy.
It is important to note that our carbon based pricing scheme is not speciﬁc to a green
supplier and could be used by all suppliers in general as the signals we used apply
to the whole grid. Also, note that our approach is different from typical sliding scale
or band pricing (where consumers simply pay different rates for different amounts
consumed) in that, in our model, the band price (p/kWh) applied to a consumer’s usage
is independent of the energy consumed by the consumer and, instead, dependent on the
real-time carbon intensity of the grid (incentivizing consumers to consume less when
the grid has a high carbon intensity).
Building upon our pricing mechanism, we next develop an agent-based homeostatic
control mechanism that provides additional signals to the agents to ensure demand
follows supply.
5. HOMEOSTATIC CONTROL
Given the variability in weather conditions affecting the generation capacity, the sys-
tem, comprising of the agents and the supplier, needs to continuously adjust to these
conditions to maximize its efﬁciency. This needs to happen given that both the supplier
and the consumers aim to maximize their individual proﬁts. More importantly, they
can only do so if they communicate to ensure that the aggregate demand from all the
consumers is as close as possible to the real-time supply from the producer, while en-
suring that any extra energy needed is bought at times when the carbon intensity of the
grid is the lowest. Only by doing so can all of the energy the supplier produces be used
(which ensures that both the supplier makes a proﬁt and the users get inexpensive and
greener electricity) and that any extra energy needed is bought at the least expensive
price from the grid.
19We choose ﬁve bands only as a representative set of bands that generally covers the trend we identify in
the correlation between carbon intensity and demand. While more bands would result in a more accurate
reﬂection of the costs for the supplier, they would also be more complex for the consumers to understand we
believe.
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Fig. 3. Flow of information in the system involving the supplier and the consumers connected to the grid.
Building on the system presented in Figure 1, consumers receive two signals; a carbon intensity signal
ρi from the grid (which they use to predict the next day’s carbon intensity) and (in addition to the price
plan shown in Figure 1) γ t+1
i (for the next day) computed by the supplier using qi (i.e., its production for
the current day) and lA
i (i.e., the overall consumption for the current day). The consumers then optimize
their electricity usage given the signal γ t+1
i and using their battery. The supplier is informed of the amount
consumed by all its customers (i.e., lA
i ), hence closing the loop. Note that we do not show the payments the
supplier receives based on splitting the consumption of its customers in terms of their green and nongreen
components (i.e., lA
i = l
A,green
i + l
A,grid
i ).
While the sensing and prediction of short-term weather conditions can be easily
implemented using existing machine learning techniques [Alpaydin 2004], signiﬁcant
challenges lie in determining the appropriate control signal to be sent to the agents
to ensure that their behavior in reaction to such a signal meets the aforesaid require-
ments. Moreover, the supplier may have to adapt the signals it sends based on the
feedback (i.e., consumption levels at different times of the day) it receives. In this
article, we address these challenges and detail the different elements of our solution
(graphically represented in Figure 3) in the following subsections.
5.1. The Signal to the Agents
The information that is typically provided by the supplier to an agent is the price
of electricity whether it is a ﬁxed, real-time, or of our carbon-based type. Using this
information, an agent can then manage its demand in order to both minimize its costs
and also its carbon emissions. While this approach is suitable for most suppliers, it is
inefﬁcient for the green supplier with its own renewable energy generation capacity.
Speciﬁcally, due to the intermittent nature of this generation capacity, the supplier
needs to signal to its pool of consumers about its generation pattern so as to maximize
the use of its green energy, thereby minimizing the carbon emissions of its consumers.
Now, a price signal would be an ineffective stimulus as it would provide no informa-
tion about how much the agents need to increase their demand during any particular
30-minute period to maximize the use of green energy (as discussed in Section 1). Thus,
we propose two new signals (see Figure 3) that address this shortcoming. First, con-
sumers are given a grid carbon intensity signal. This signal may be provided either by
the grid operators (over the Internet) or by the supplier (collecting the data from grid
operators) through the meter (the band prices are agreed with the supplier well before).
The signal allows the consumer to compute its cost of electricity based on our pricing
mechanism outlined earlier on. Second, the supplier provides the consumer with a tar-
get γi ∈ R+∀i ∈ T to increase (γi > 1) or decrease (γi < 1) its consumption with respect
to the previous day’s consumption at time i such that demand follows supply in the day
ahead. This target γi is based on the aggregate consumption at time interval i given
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by lA
i and the production from the supplier qi, and is given as γi =
qi
lA
i
. In Section 5.3 we
will show how to adapt this signal to consider the feedback that the supplier gets from
the population of agents. For now, however, assuming that all consumers in the system
react to this signal (by storing electricity when most incentivized to do so), we expect
the aggregate demand to approach this target, thus maximizing green energy usage
and minimizing the carbon emissions of the consumers. Thus, if agents meet this target
exactly, they are expected to pay only pgreen for every unit of electricity used. However,
if an agent overuses (above the target), it increases the expected cost of electricity as
the supplier would need to acquire the additional demand at p
grid
i prices. On the other
hand, if it underuses (below the target), the agent misses out on less expensive and
greener electricity.
Next, we present an optimization model for an agent that aims to minimize its costs
given its load and storage availability (see Figure 3). In particular, we consider that the
agent obtains part of its energy demand from the green supplier described in Section
3.1 and is already contracted to pay p
green
i for every kWh provided by its supplier from
its own sources (wind or sun). Then, the agent receives two signals from the supplier,
that is p
grid
i , computed based on the carbon-pricing scheme agreed beforehand and the
real-time carbon intensity of the grid, and γ
t+1
i ∈ [0,1]. We assume that the agent
obtains these signals a day ahead (but this could equally also be a few hours ahead
as is commonly the case for wind generators which can predict reasonably accurately
how much they are going to be able to provide in such time frames [Milligan et al.
2009]). Thus, the agent would need to reoptimize its behavior whenever it receives
updates of γi.
5.2. The Agents’ Behavior
Since we assume that an agent’s daily consumption (load) proﬁle is ﬁxed (i.e., price does
not affect the loads in a single time slot but can affect stored or discharged energy),
an agent a can only try to minimize its costs by storing energy when prices are low
and using as much of that energy as possible when prices are high. Thus, we consider
agent a having to plan its storage for the day ahead, that is t+1, if t is the current day.
As opposed our previous model [Vytelingum et al. 2010],20 the agent does not need to
predict the next day’s price for each time slot. Rather, we assume the agent predicts
the next day’s carbon intensity ρi for each half-hourly interval of the day and using
the price plan proposed in Section 3.1, computes a price p
grid
i (since p
green
i is known to
all agents a priori). Given the uncertainty in its own consumption for the next day, the
agent also needs to predict  
a,t+1
i which is its own expected total load at time i for the
next day and here we assume that  
a,t+1
i = 1
k
t
t−k 
a,t
i , that is, a moving average over k
previous (similar) days’ consumption (we choose k = 3).21
Now, the agent also has to decide how to adjust its consumption for individual time
slots based on the signal γi sent by the supplier. Since γ
t+1
i implies a factor change
in the current day’s overall consumption l
a,t
i , the best an agent can do is to try and
bound the total amount of energy it consumes at i by γ
t+1
i l
a,t
i . By so doing, the agent
20The model presented here is also different from our previous work in that the aggregate demand of the
population of agents does not inﬂuence prices or carbon intensity values on the grid. This is due to the fact
that the population of agents tied to the green supplier is considered too small to inﬂuence the grid’s overall
performance.
21Consumption on average tends to be similar during weekdays but weekday consumption is typically
different from weekend consumption. Moreover, load proﬁles tend to change across seasons and for special
days (e.g., Christmas or for special sporting events). Hence, agents would have to take these differences into
account in their prediction if such a system were deployed.
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Fig. 4. Mathematical program used by an agent to ﬁnd its optimal storage strategy.
can maximize the probability that it will pay the best price pgreen, as offered by the
supplier (as explained in Section 3.1).
Our solution to this optimization problem is formulated as a mathematical program
as given in Figure 4. The output is the storage proﬁle, ba = ba+ −ba− at every time slot
during the day.
The objective of the agent is captured by the minimization function in Eq. (1).22 Then
Constraint 1 expresses the fact that the total load of the agent at any point in time
is the sum of the amount it stores and the amount it consumes. Constraints 2 and
3 decouple the amount consumed by the agent in terms of the green and nongreen
components since the green component (i.e., l
a,green
i ) is limited by the supplier according
to its signal γi through γil
a,t
i (in Constraint 3). Constraints 4, 5, and 6 restrict the ﬂow
in the battery to ensure it respects the battery’s efﬁciency limitations (as limited by αa),
22The storage optimization model we present here tries to capture the key features of the storage device
and the load proﬁle of the consumers. While other constraints could be added (e.g., a bound on the cost the
consumer is willing to pay, or the maximum energy allowed to be charged in any time slot to prevent the
battery from overheating), we believe we have captured the main ones and have validated this with our
industrial partners.
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that the amount (dis)charged in any time slot respects the limits b
a−
i and b
a+
i ,a n dt h a t
the energy that can be stored or used at any point during the day respects the state
of the battery at that point in the day. Finally, Constraint 7 prevents the agent from
simply storing electricity to sell back to the grid. As can be seen, the mathematical
program only has linear constraints and a linear objective function. Hence, linear
programming solvers (e.g., CPLEX or glpk) can be directly applied to ﬁnd the solution.
In our implementation, we found that the optimal solution is obtained within a few
milliseconds.23
Note that the last constraint can be removed in a system where consumers are
allowed to sell power back to the grid and that ea can be ﬁxed or unconstrained. In line
with our model (see Section 3), ca is the relatively small discounted running cost of
using storage, ea is the storage capacity, αa is the efﬁciency of the agent’s storage, ba
+ is
its maximum charging and ba
− its maximum discharging rates, and ea
0 is the storage at
the beginning of the day which equals the storage at the end of the day (i.e., charging
at the end of a day for the next day).
Now, not all agents may possess storage capacity (or some may not have enough
storage to cover their whole consumption) and this is not known to the supplier a
priori. The effect of this can be quite dramatic (as we shall show in Section 6). In
particular, with limited storage, agents are less able to react to the variability in
supply (communicated through the γ signals). This, in turn, can result in the supplier
incorrectly estimating the outcome of aggregate consumers’ response to its signals,
leading to greater demand from the grid at peak times and hence higher prices. In
the next subsection, we present a novel adaptive mechanism that allows a supplier to
determine the appropriate γi to be sent to a population of agents that may have limited
storage.
5.3. The Adaptive Mechanism
The aim of the adaptive mechanism is to learn the optimal signal to send to the
agents (see Figure 3) (given their response to a previously sent signal). Now, if
the supplier were to have complete and perfect information about the system (i.e.,
the proportion of consumers with demand-side management capabilities that can use
orstoreenergyinreactiontoasupplier’ssignal)andcompletecontrolofthesystem(i.e.,
control the capabilities owned by its consumers), it would be able to deﬁne (and com-
municate) exactly the storage proﬁle of each consumer to minimize its total cost. The
same optimization model deﬁned in Eq. (1) could be used by aggregating the charging
and discharging capabilities of all consumers and their loads as
min

a∈A

i∈I
p
green
i l
a,green
i + p
grid
i l
a,grid
i + caea, (2)
subject to Constraints 1 to 7 as in Figure 4. In so doing, we can ﬁnd an optimal solution
to the behaviors of consumers that will result in the most efﬁcient use of green energy.
Now, in a more realistic setting, the only feedback that the supplier obtains from
its consumers is their total load on the grid, that is  i + bi (as shown in Figure 3).
Assuming that the supplier can accurately estimate the average load of each consumer
 a
i , a simplistic approach to set the control signal γ
t+1
i would be
γ
t+1
i =
qt
i 
a∈A a
i
. (3)
23We used IBM’s ILOG CPLEX 12.2 to implement the linear programming model.
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Fig. 5. The adaptive mechanism given a chosen learning rate βS and inputs qt
i and l
A,t
i .
Thisissimplytheratiobetweenthetotalgreenenergyfromthesupplierqt
i andthetotal
load from the agents at time slot i. The aim here would be to tell the agents to adjust
their loads (using the battery ba
i )s ot h a tγi ideally converges to 1 (i.e., demand following
supply). However, this approach assumes that all consumers have storage capability,
as the supplier is signaling to each one of its consumers to increase its demand by a
portion of the green energy produced. Ideally, the supplier should do so only for those
consumers that are able to react to such a signal (i.e., those with storage capability).
However, such information is not readily available to the supplier as consumers do
not have to and may not want to reveal such information to their supplier (because
they may not trust it to use this information to their beneﬁt). Hence, the challenge is
to adapt γi using only the feedback from the agents. We present our solution to this
problem in Figure 5.
In more detail, we propose a novel adaptive version of γi based on current aggregate
demand and the supplier’s green energy production. As can be seen, using the adaptive
signal, the homeostatic control mechanism tries to minimize the difference between
green energy produced and current total demand based on a learning rate βS which
determinestherateatwhichitwillchangeγi toreﬂectthefeedbackitreceives.Thisrate
is critical in determining whether the mechanism converges to the optimal solution (as
we will see in Section 6). Thus, when the green energy produced is higher than the total
demand, it implies an opportunity to maximize the use of green energy and reduce the
carbon emissions of the consumers is lost and therefore γi is compensated positively
(i.e., top condition in Figure 5) to increase the total demand of all the consumers.
However when the total demand is too high, the supplier signals its consumers to
reduce their use of green energy (i.e., bottom condition in Figure 5) at time i (and
ensuring that γi is never negative). As we empirically demonstrate in Section 6, the
daily total demand gradually changes such that the efﬁciency of green energy usage
converges to the optimal (deﬁned by the optimal solution of Eq. (2)).
In the next section, we evaluate our homeostatic control mechanism for different
proportionsofthepopulationwithstoragecapabilityanddemonstratehowouradaptive
system remains robust (i.e., keeps costs low and efﬁciency of green energy usage high)
even when the error with which the supplier predicts his own supply of green energy
(i.e., qi) increases.
6. EVALUATION
The aim of this evaluation is to empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of the
homeostatic control mechanism presented in the previous section in inducing demand
to follow supply such that the carbon emissions of the system are reduced. We adopt
an empirical approach here, as opposed to an analytical approach seeking equilibrium
characterisations,inordertoevaluatethesystemunderawidervarietyofsettingsthan
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would be feasible within a theoretical framework,24 and predict equilibrium outcomes
(for differently parameterized versions of our mechanism) without overly restrictive
assumptions. As we will see, despite the utility-maximizing behavior of consumers
with storage capability, the system quickly converges to the optimal behavior. In this
context, we deﬁne optimal behavior as the solution to Eq. (2) as discussed in Section 5.3.
In what follows, we ﬁrst detail our experimental setup and then go on to evaluate
the efﬁciency of our homeostatic control mechanism (against the optimal behavior) in
terms of green energy use and costs of electricity, in particular for different proportions
of the population with storage capability. We focus on the proportions with storage
capacity to identify the critical amount of storage needed in the population to achieve
the maximum returns on investment in batteries for individual users and for the
population as a whole. We also demonstrate how the supplier’s adaptive behavior
signiﬁcantly improves the system. Finally, we analyse the sensitivity of our mechanism
against prediction (of green energy production) errors.25
6.1. Experimental Setup
We simulate a pool of 5000 consumers26 subscribed to a green supplier that is able to
supply 50% of its demand from its own renewable sources and the remainder bought
from the grid. Our choice of the proportion of green energy was designed to model one of
the most popular green suppliers in UK, namely Ecotricity which produced 41% of the
electricity it supplies to its consumers from its own renewable sources in 2009–2010
and expects to reach 50% within the year.
Electricity is priced using the carbon-based pricing scheme detailed in Section 4.
Furthermore, we model the generation capacity as values drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution (between 0 and 1) for each of the 30-min time slots. Each value is averaged
using a discrete Gaussian ﬁlter (i.e., using normally distributed weights with mean 0
and standard deviation of 1 to model the effect of gradually changing wind patterns by
removing any high-frequency changes) over the vector of 48 time slots across the day.
The values of the time slots are then linearly scaled such that the sum total of these
values equals 50% of the daily demand of the consumers. Furthermore, we set the limit
for the prices bands at ρmin =  0,275,325,375,425 , ρmax =  275,325,375,425,∞  and
pgrid =  29,41,51,59,71 assuminga10%proﬁtmarginforthesupplier.Finally,thede-
mandofeachconsumerismodeledontherealUKdataproﬁleoftheaverageuseronthe
Domestic Unconstrained Tariff (i.e., the typical UK average proﬁle before any demand-
side management technologies, such as storage, are used [Vytelingum et al. 2010])
and the simulation is run 500 times, each run lasting 100 days. These values were
chosen to ensure the statistical signiﬁcance of our analysis.27
24We acknowledge that a theoretical analysis of our mechanism would allow us to ascertain the properties
of our control mechanism and, since this goes well beyond the scope of this article, we aim to do such an
analysis in future work.
25Apart from the model presented by Vytelingum et al. [2010], we are not aware of any other micro-storage
optimization models that have been devised to respond to real-time prices. Since Vytelingum et al.’s model
did not consider the control signal we use in our case, we benchmark against it as a system where homeostatic
control is not used.
26Larger population sizes do not show any signiﬁcant differences to the insights we provide here. Speciﬁcally,
the results with different population sizes showed that the system becomes more efﬁcient as the population
size increases. We also experimented with real data from a population of about 1000 users in the south west of
Englandandconﬁrmedthatsimilarresultswereobtainedtothesimulationprovidedtheoptimizationcarried
out by agents was carried out more frequently (on a half-hourly basis) to take into account the spiky nature
of their consumption (as opposed to the smooth cycles simulated in our experiments which allow a daily
optimization to work). However, due to U.K. data protection issues, such results cannot be reproduced here.
27Using multiple samples of the results, we validated our conclusions using a t-test with α = 0.05 and found
that there was no signiﬁcant difference between the means of the samples.
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Fig. 6. Efﬁciency of green energy usage for the system with and without the adaptive mechanism. The
system with no homeostatic control is only 79.5% efﬁcient throughout.
Next, we assume that only a proportion of the population has storage capability
(i.e., they own storage devices capable of storing 4kWh with charging and discharging
efﬁciency uniformly distributed between 0.3kW and 0.5kW to model current storage
devices [Vytelingum et al. 2010]). The consumers with storage capabilities are thus
able to optimize their storage proﬁle to reduce their costs (and implicitly reduce their
carbon emissions as a result of our carbon-based pricing scheme). Given a control signal
from the supplier, we empirically demonstrate in this section how the system efﬁciency
improves in terms of carbon emissions (i.e., by minimizing energy used from the grid
and maximizing green energy use).
6.2. Efﬁciency of Homeostatic Control
First, we analyse the daily effect of homeostatic control on the system.We do so by
comparing the green energy usage efﬁciency (i.e., the percentage of green energy that
is directly used by the consumers contracted to the supplier) and the cost of electricity
used (based on the carbon-based pricing scheme and the Band 0 pricing of the supplier)
in a system with and without homeostatic control. Furthermore, we also demonstrate
the effectiveness of our adaptive mechanism and how it allows the system to converge
to an optimal solution (given in Section 5.3).
From Figure 6, given a population with 50% having storage capability, we can see
a daily convergence of our homeostatic control system with an adaptive mechanism,
for different learning rates βS, to the optimal solution at 91.8%. As can be seen,
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, Vol. 2, No. 4, Article 35, Publication date: July 2011.35:20 S. D. Ramchurn et al.
the nonadaptive version is not very efﬁcient (i.e., only 88.3%) as it overestimates
the proportion of the population with storage and understates γ that represents the
amount of green energy available to consumers with storage. When the supplier
adopts the adaptive mechanism using a higher learning rate (i.e., βS = 0.05), this
leads to a faster, though less smooth, convergence as opposed to a slower, but smoother
convergence to the lower learning rate (i.e., βS = 0.005). In general, this demonstrates
that the emergent behavior of individually utility-maximizing agents is indeed
efﬁcient such that the system maximizes its use of green energy, avoiding having to
acquire electricity from the grid as the consumers change their demand proﬁles to
follow green supply. Also, an efﬁcient outcome means that the consumers have lower
carbon emissions overall since they maximize their use of renewable energy (and thus,
minimize their use of grid energy). Because the objectives of reducing carbon emissions
and minimizing costs are aligned through the carbon-based pricing scheme, the selﬁsh
utility-maximizing behavior of a consumer allows it to be as green as it could be. Next,
we analyse the system at an equilibrium state (i.e., once the system has converged
after a number of days), for different proportions of the population that have storage
capability.
6.3. Effect of the Population Size with Storage Capability
Based on the previous experiment, here we set the learning rate at βS = 0.005 (to
ensure convergence) for our homeostatic control mechanism and vary the proportion of
the population with storage capability from 0 to 1. Figure 7(a) shows the green energy
usage efﬁciency (as a percentage of the generation capacity) for different storage
penetration in the population (at the end of 100 simulation days). First, we observe
that when too many consumers adopt storage, the system with no homeostatic control
wastes more green energy (when the proportion is greater than 0.6 in particular).
This is because too many consumers are blindly optimizing their demands based
only on market prices, unaware of the green production, with efﬁciency decreasing
to 72%.
Now, when given a signal about green production (as in the homeostatic control
mechanisms), the consumers are signiﬁcantly greener as they are optimizing their
demand based on how much and when green energy is available to them. With no
storage in the system (i.e., no storage capability), green energy usage efﬁciency is the
same with and without homeostatic control as a signal is then redundant. As storage
penetration increases, the homeostatic control system becomes greener (having to use
less electricity from the grid and more of the supplier’s green energy). When storage
penetration is at itshighest, we can see how the effect of homeostatic control peaks with
up to a 25% increase in green energy usage efﬁciency (i.e., a 25% decrease in carbon
emissions) compared to without homeostatic control. In addition, Figure 7(b) (log-scale)
alsocomparesthesystem,atequilibrium,withandwithouthomeostaticcontrolagainst
the optimal solution (i.e., we are comparing the relative error between the optimal
solution and where the system converges to). We can see that our adaptive mechanism
allows the system to converge to within 0.5% of the optimal solution as opposed to up
to 4.4% without an adaptive mechanism and up to 25% without homeostatic control.
Next, we investigate the effect of different penetrations of storage in the population on
the cost of electricity.
6.4. The Cost of Electricity
Here we use our carbon-based pricing scheme to evaluate the cost of electricity given
that different proportions of the population are able to utilize the full capacity of the
green supplier. We consider cases where the cost of storage is added to the overall costs
of the consumer or not. Thus, if cost of storage is fully subsidized, we observe from
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Fig. 7. Green energy usage efﬁciency with and without homeostatic control for different proportions of the
population with storage. The relative deviation from the optimal solution (as computed in Eq. (2)) is given
in (b).
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Figure 8 the decreasing trend which results from more consumers being able to change
their demand to use green and less expensive energy. Furthermore, the cost without
homeostatic control is marginally higher than with homeostatic control. The individual
savings of a consumer with storage are maximized when the demand response of the
population is maximized. At this point, it results in up to 14.5% lower costs because it
can optimize its demand for greener and less expensively priced electricity. Conversely,
when there is no storage in the system, a single consumer deciding whether to adopt
storage would be able to make 7.5% savings even if she were the only one to have
storage in the system. Indeed, this points to a signiﬁcant incentive for consumers to
adopt storage. Moreover, because the payoff of owning storage (rather than not) is
always higher, it is likely that all consumers will eventually acquire storage devices
and capitalize on the supplier’s control signal of green energy.28
Next, we assume that there is a cost to storage. Speciﬁcally, we assume a storage
device typically costing £200 per kWh and a startup cost of £200 (i.e., installation cost,
wiring,andvoltageinverter), withalifetimeof10years.Whenthecostsarespreadover
the lifetime and with a capacity of 4kWh, this equals to a cost of 6p/kWh per day. From
Figure 8, we can observe an increase in the cost of storage with homeostatic control
(as we now factor in the cost of storage). However, a system with homeostatic control
still remains less costly than without, changing from 3.1% less expensive (when the
28Note that the setting we analyse here is different from Vytelingum et al.’s [2010] where they describe how
eventually the system converges to an equilibrium where only 38% require storage. In our context, we are
looking at a single supplier and its consumers (with changes in total demand proﬁle small enough to have
no effect on wholesale market prices), while they consider the whole grid where changes in market demand
affect wholesale market prices.
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proportion of the population with storage is low) to 9.8% (when the whole population
has storage).
6.5. Effect of Green Energy Prediction Error
Given that the supplier’s generation capacity is dependent on weather conditions and
hence uncertain, we investigate the sensitivity of our system with respect to prediction
errors in green energy production (since the signal is a prediction of green energy to
be produced in a near future, typically 3–4 hours). We do so to evaluate the sensitivity
of our homeostatic control mechanism to prediction errors and do so by analysing the
efﬁciency of our system in the presence of prediction errors.
From Figures 9(a) and 9(b), we can see how the system performs if the supplier
overstates or understates its green production. In particular, we can observe that
efﬁciency increases slightly (by up to 0.5%) when the supplier overstates γ. This is
because storage-capable consumers are recommended to use more green energy than
availableensuringthatallthegreenenergywillbeused.Thusthegreenenergy-focused
supplier (i.e., motivated to use all the green energy it produces to supply its consumers)
is more inclined to slightly overstate γ. However, in so doing, the total demand will
be higher than the green energy available at peak times (when consumers are most
incentivized to use green energy because of the greater cost of grid electricity) such that
the supplier will need to buy from the grid to cover the difference, leading to higher
costs. When the supplier slightly overstates γ, we can clearly see that cost increases
exponentially (see Figure 9(b)) while efﬁciency only increases by up to a negligible 0.5%
(see Figure 9(a)).
On the other hand, when the supplier understates γ, the cost increases while efﬁ-
ciency decreases, such that the system is worse off both in terms of cost and efﬁciency.
Thus, crucially to minimize cost (and trade off only up to 0.5%), the supplier is incen-
tivizedtopredictaccuratelysincepoorprediction(whetherunderstatingoroverstating)
invariably results in rapidly increasing costs for its consumers. However, when the ab-
solute prediction error is small, the increase in costs is also small such that the system
is relatively nonsensitive to small prediction errors. Speciﬁcally, when the supplier
understates γ by up to 10%, the cost only increases by up to 0.5% and, by up to 0.08%
when it overstates γ by up to 10%. This suggests that our system is relatively robust
against small errors in prediction.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have presented a novel decentralized homeostatic control mecha-
nism for a green supplier and its consumers connected through the grid. Our approach
is underpinned by the use of autonomous software agents endowed with algorithms
to optimize their owners’ energy consumption. We fully utilize the real-time carbon
intensity signal provided by existing information and communication technologies cou-
pled with a ﬂexible carbon-based pricing in order to implement real-time pricing in
the smart grid for any type of supplier (green or brown). Given this, we have shown
how agents can optimize their consumption of energy by storing electricity at times
when it is inexpensive, thereby maximizing their individual utility and minimizing
their carbon footprint. Building upon the feedback from the population of agents, the
homeostatic control mechanism implements a control signal that the supplier learns
to adapt to maximize its green energy usage by incentivizing the portion of the pop-
ulation with storage capability to optimize their storage of electricity in such a way
that their individual selﬁsh behavior is aligned with the greater good of the system.
We demonstrate that such an adaptive mechanism is essential for an efﬁcient system,
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Fig. 9. Effect of inaccurate green generation prediction. With no homeostatic control, cost is 10% more than
the optimal cost throughout, as is the efﬁciency of green usage at 79.5%.
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and indeed, we empirically demonstrate that it allows the system to converge to an
optimal solution. Thus, we are able to show that our mechanism can achieve up to 25%
greater efﬁciency for the supplier and up to 14.5% savings for the consumer over other
single-signal-based mechanisms. We also demonstrate that the system is not sensitive
to small prediction errors and that a supplier is incentivized to predict accurately its
green production to minimize costs.
In general, our work demonstrates the strengths of closer synergies between power
systems and information and communication technologies by showing how real-time
consumption and carbon emissions data can be used to make electricity distribution
more efﬁcient. Moreover, our approach departs from the traditional approaches that
did not consider the self-interested behaviors of consumers with different preferences,
constraints (on storage capacity), and consumption proﬁles. Hence, we believe this is
the ﬁrst realistic step in building deployable multiagent systems in the grid. However,
this article also highlights the challenges that lie in building robust communication
technologies and autonomous agents for home energy management. In particular,
while robust communications are needed to guarantee that signals are provided
in a timely fashion to all actors in the system (i.e., γ for the agents and real-time
consumption data for the supplier), intelligent agents need to be designed to learn
the patterns of behavior of their owners either by analysing their usage proﬁle or
interacting with them through new user interfaces such as those of AlertMe or Google
PowerMeter.
In future we aim to investigate the properties of our control mechanism within a
more theoretical framework in order to prove its convergence properties (under speciﬁc
settings) and expand our optimization model to consider other types of constraints (e.g.,
bounds on energy storage to extend battery life or decay in battery storage capacity).
Moreover, to improve the practical performance of our mechanism we aim develop
better prediction algorithms. While in our simulations we assumed that the renewable
power generation does not vary signiﬁcantly across days, this may not always be the
case. Hence, we will investigate the robustness of our system given different volatilities
for renewable power generation. Indeed, it is important to note that our approach is
highly dependent on the predictions that both suppliers and consumers can make
about the generation and consumption of energy, respectively. While we have studied
how prediction errors on the supplier side affect the system, we have simpliﬁed the
model of the consumers to avoid signiﬁcant prediction errors. The main challenge here
is that consumer behavior tends to vary signiﬁcantly between days, across seasons, and
on speciﬁc days (e.g., sporting events or holidays) and predicting the daily consumption
is a challenging task that is likely to require advanced machine learning solutions and
human-agent interaction mechanisms that will allow agents to understand the users’
future consumption intentions. Indeed, a major assumption of our approach is that
users will be happy to delegate the task of shifting energy to their agents in the hope
to get the best deal. While this may be ﬁne for some people, others may not trust their
agents to act on their behalf in such a sensitive domain. Given this, work is needed
to develop good feedback interfaces and interaction mechanisms for humans to trust
their agents.
Another important future direction involves extending the model to consider mul-
tiple green suppliers operating in the grid such that they constitute the majority
of the energy producers. This, we believe, will require more advanced control tech-
niques given that carbon intensity signals may disappear altogether and a key ob-
jective of suppliers will change from maximizing green energy usage to ensuring
that demand always follows supply throughout the grid in order to avoid brownouts
and blackouts.
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APPENDIX
A. NOMENCLATURE
Half-hourly time-slots T ={ 1,2,...,48}
Agent a ∈ A
Agent’s load proﬁle  a
i ∀i ∈ T
Agent’s storage proﬁle ba
i ∀i ∈ T
Agent’s demand proﬁle la
i ∀i ∈ T
Agent’s demand proﬁle priced as green energy l
a,green
i ∀i ∈ T
Agent’s demand proﬁle priced as grid l
a,green
i ∀i ∈ T
Agent’s storage charging proﬁle b
a+
i ∀i ∈ T
Agent’s storage discharging proﬁle b
a−
i ∀i ∈ T
Agent’s storage charging capacity ba
+
Agent’s storage discharging capacity ba
−
Agent’s storage efﬁciency ea
Agent’s storage capacity ca
Aggregate demand proﬁle lA
i ∀i ∈ T
Aggregate demand proﬁle from green production l
A,green
i ∀i ∈ T
Aggregate demand proﬁle from grid l
A,grid
i ∀i ∈ T
Grid price bands p
grid
n ∈ R+ where n ∈{ 1,2,3,4,5}
Carbon intensity ρi ∈ R+ ∀i ∈ T
Green production price pgreen ∈ R+
Grid price p
grid
i ∈ R+ ∀i ∈ T
Green supplier production qi ∈ R+ ∀i ∈ T
Supplier’s control signal γi ∈ R+ ∀i ∈ T
Learning rate of supplier’s adaptive mechanism βS ∈ [0,1]
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